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Abstract 
An ideal signature material and method, which can be used to prove the authenticity 
of a physical item and against forgery, should be immune to the fast developments in 
digital and engineering technologies. Herein, the design of signature material 
combining cryptographic hash function and DNA steganography is proposed. The 
encrypting materials are used to construct a series of time-stamped records 
(blockchain) associated with published hash values, while each DNA-encrypted block 
is associated with a set of DNA keys. The decrypted DNA information, as digital 
keys, can be validated through a hash function to compare with the published hash 
values. The blocks can also be cross-referenced among different related signatures.  
While both digital cryptography and DNA steganography can have large key size, 
automated brutal force search is far more labor intensive and expensive for DNA 
steganography with wet lab experiments, as compared to its digital counterpart. 
Moreover, the time-stamped blockchain structure permits the incorporation of new 
cryptographic functions and DNA steganographies over time, thus can evolve over 
time without losing the continuous history line.  
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Because of the fast developments in digital and engineering technologies, many 
methods used to be considered as safe and secure have become increasingly 
questionable, including signature and stamp for self-identification. For 3D objects, 
additive manufacturing (3D printing)1-2 represents a revolution in mechanical 
engineer, however, will also make counterfeit not only remarkably easier but also 
drastically faster and cheaper. Digital technology would not provide the ultimate 
solution, which it has helped to create. For example, the power and utility of 
cryptographic hash function3 and prime factorization are based on the hypothesis 
that parallel computation will not be realized in the near future. Therefore, for long-
term security challenges, making hash values with more bits would not provide the 
final solution. What’s unbreakable today might be very different after hundreds and 
thousands of years. Although data safety over a long period of time is not relevant for 
most of our daily activities, it could be very critical for proving the authenticity of 
physical items, e.g. an important document, an art work, or an item of historical 
significance.  
 
Figure 1. Hybrid signature strategy. DNA-based materials containing one or multiple DECs 
will be added to a physical item to be certificated. In this example, the DEC1-DEC9 are 
shared by all three items. The author as well as the collectors will generate their own DECs, 
as well as acquire DECs from third parties. The connection between a third party with the 
author or a collector will be published. Each DEC can be decrypted by a set of DNA keys, to 
reveal the DNA information, which will be used as digital key. The digital keys will be 
validated through a cryptographic hash function, while the hash values were previously 
published. Over time, new DECs will be added to the item by future collectors, to establish a 
blockchain. Examples of generating Hash1, Hash2 and Hash3 are shown in the supporting 
information.  
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Molecular signatures, which can be easily incorporated into various physical objects 
(e.g. ink, paper, texture, etc), are attractive for developing new certification tools. As 
novel data storage4-10 and encryption medium11-14, DNA possesses high capacity and 
longevity, and can be amplified and operated biochemically to perform computational 
tasks15-18. Herein, a signature material combining cryptographic hash function with 
DNA steganography (figure 1 and 2a) is proposed.  Encrypted DNA materials are 
added to the item to be certificated as molecular signature. To decrypt the DNA-
encoded information needs to perform biochemical experiments with specific 
knowledge (DNA keys), and the revealed DNA information will be used as digital 
keys. The digital keys will be validated through a cryptographic hash function (e.g. 
SHA-256 or SHA-512), while the hash values were previously published (Figure 2a). 
Therefore, to prove the authenticity of an item, people must be able: i) to extract 
signature materials from the item; ii) to use a set of DNA keys to generate digital 
keys experimentally; and iii) to validate the digital keys (Figure 2a).  
As a technology complimentary to digital cryptography to improve data safety, the 
DNA steganography can be as complex as compute-based algorithms such as SHA-
256 and SHA-512. More importantly, decryption of DNA steganography requires to 
perform biochemical experiments with the physical item of interest in wet labs. This 
process will be much more labor intensive, thus limiting the use of automated brutal 
force search, which is drastically easier for silicon-base computation than for wet lab 
experiments. The DNA steganography method used in the paper possesses a QKD 
(Quantum Key Distribution)-like function and a self-destructive mechanism (Figure 
2b)14. QKD is based on the feature that the process of measuring a quantum system 
disturbs the system19-20. A solution of DNA molecules does not possess the property 
of quantum superposition. However, if an attempt of measurement can change its 
composition and leave a permanent trace, the design of DNA steganography can be 
considered as QKD-like. The QKD-like function and self-destructive feature can 
prevent un-authorized sample replication, thus prohibiting high throughput testing of 
the amplified DNA materials. Furthermore, the protocol includes a blockchain 
mechanism21, allowing to improve information safety over time.  
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Figure 2. Encoding/decoding protocol and DEC design. A) DECs are designed, 
synthesized, and added to the item to be certificated over time, to establish a blockchain. B) 
Each DEC is a mixture of a d-DNA, and an i-DNA. To prevent to be analyzed by high 
throughput sequencing, DECs are pre-mixed with genomic DNA before applying to the item 
to be certificated. Each DEC can be decoded by applying the DNA key 1 (primers An and Bn) 
and DNA key 2 (restriction enzyme En). The pseudo-restriction sites En’s are restriction sites 
different from En, to prevent digestions using a mixture of enzymes. When a wrong enzyme is 
used, the i-DNA will be destroyed.  
DEC (DNA encrypting constructs) design 
As a DNA-based signature material, a DEC contains the information about the DNA 
keys, which are used to reveal the encrypted digital key (DNA sequence as In in 
figure 1). A randomness-incorporating DNA steganography14 was applied to design 
the DECs, which needs two types of DNA keys for decrypting each DEC, including a 
pair of DNA primers and a restriction enzyme (Figure 2b). The message (the 
sequence of DNA In, which will later be used as the digital key) is flanked by two 
primer sequences (An and Bn) and the resulting i-DNA is mixed with d-DNA (in large 
excess). The d-DNA possesses the same length and shares the same primers as i-
DNA, thus can function as a mask to cover the i-DNA, even when the primers for a 
certain DEC are known. The middle region of d-DNA contains a restriction site En 
flanked by two randomized sequences. For example, if the middle region of the d-
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DNA is 20 bp and the restriction site is 6 bp, the resulting d-DNA presents a 414 
sequence-diversity. The randomness is important for the QKD-like function and self-
destruction feature, as discussed later.  
The message In can be revealed through sequencing after digesting the d-DNA with 
the right restriction enzyme and amplification with the right primers An and Bn. 
Without the right restriction enzyme pre-treatment (DNA key-2), heating associated 
with PCR amplification will cause reshuffling among many different d-DNA 
sequences and i-DNA sequence. Consequently, the restriction site flanked by 
mismatches cannot be recognized by restriction enzyme. Eventually, this process will 
leave a permanent trace (QKD-like function) and make the information unreadable 
(self-destruction), even when the sample is afterwards subjected to the right 
processing.  
This DNA key-2 of the basic DEC format a could be possibly bypassed when a 
mixture of restriction enzymes is applied, though different enzymes often need 
different specific buffer conditions. This can be circumvented by including a pseudo-
restriction site En’ in the i-DNA strands, either in the information part or in the primer 
sequence, as shown in the DEC formats b and g, respectively. To prepare the 
signature materials of DECs, the synthetic DNA sequences will be premixed with 
large excess of genomic DNA, which can cover the DECs and prevent them from 
analysis using next generation sequencing.  
Key sizes of DECs 
Every DEC has two types DNA keys: Key-1 is the two primers and Key-2 is the 
restriction enzyme. The optimal length for PCR primers is 18-22 nt. As a very 
conservative estimation, each prime with > 16 correct nt would be sufficient for PCR 
and the two primers are equivalent to 416 x 416 = 64 bits of information. Additionally, 
people will need the right restriction enzyme for reading the information, which would 
add an additional > 27 – 28 probability (>7 bit, for about 200 enzymes). As shown in 
figure 1, the author's information is encrypted in (64+7) x 5 = 355 bits (Dec1 to DEC5). 
Not mentioning the laborious and expensive experiments with DNA, such information 
in their digital form cannot be decrypted through automated brutal force search. With 
the addition of new DECs to the item to grow the blockchain over time, the resulting 
system will become increasingly difficult for decryption.  
Encoding protocol 
The author will add his DECs and the DECs acquired from third parties (e.g. law firm 
or connoisseur) to the item to be certificated (e.g. DEC1-9 in figure 1). A third party 
plays a role similar to block creators (for digital currencies such as bitcoin) and is 
rewarded for their activities to provide as well as to validate the DECs. To further 
grow the blockchain, the collectors will add their DECs and the DECs from third 
parties (e.g. DEC10-16 in figure 1). The associations between author or collectors 
with their related third parties will be published. Hash1 is generated with I1-I5 (e.g. 
through SHA-256 or SHA-512). The new DNA-encoded information, together with the 
hash value n-1 (figure 3), will be used to generate hash value n. While DNA keys and 
digital keys will be kept secret (by author, collector, and third party), the hash values 
will be published.  
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Figure 3. Development of blockchain. A) Hash1 is generated with I1-I5. The new digital 
keys, together with the hash value n-1, will be used to generate hash value n. B-C) Some 
information will be lost over time. An item that can provide the most complete block chain, in 
full or the closest agreement with the published records, should be considered with the 
highest confidence as authentic. For example, the item A’ is more likely to be authentic than 
A’’. 
The author will generate a set of DECs for his own, as well as acquiring a set of 
DECs from one or multiple third parties. The author will pass his DNA keys and 
digital keys, but not those from the third parties, to the collector #1. This will allow 
future collector (e.g. collector #2) to check the authenticity with the third parties. This 
is in the interest of the author, because this will prevent the collector #1 to make 
counterfeits based on the obtained information. The collector #1 will add his DEC, 
with the option of adding the DECs from one or multiple third parties. The collector #1 
will pass the author’s and his keys to the collector #2. The collector #1 will not pass 
the keys from the third parties to collector #2. This is in the interest of the collector 
#1, because this will prevent the collector #2 to use collector #1’s credibility to make 
counterfeits in the future. A hash value can be generated either by a single digital key 
(e.g. H(hash4, I12) = Hash5, where H(x) is a hash function) or with multiple digital keys 
(e.g. H(hash3, I10, I11) = Hash4). The latter is certainly saver than the former.  
Discussion 
In ancient China, people have developed an elegant method to prove the authenticity 
of art works, most commonly for paintings and calligraphies. The author put his 
stamp, often multiple stamps onto the piece. In the following years and centuries, 
both collectors and connoisseurs will add their stamps to the piece. Because their 
stamps can also be found in many other documents, they can be cross-referenced 
with each other. Therefore, the more cross-referencing stamps can be found on a 
piece, the higher confidence regarding the authenticity will a collector have. Similarly, 
a blockchain, which leads to the creation of bitcoin and many other digital currencies, 
is a growing list of records, called blocks, that are linked using cryptography. Each 
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block contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, a timestamp, and 
transaction data. The blockchain method is the digital counterpart of the stamp-chain, 
based on the assumptions that it is very difficult to fake multiple stamps (in ancient 
time), as well as to reverse password encryption of a one-way hash function (with 
modern computational power).  
Using the protocol described in this paper, the authenticity can be confirmed with the 
presence of Physical item (e.g. hand-written signature), the biochemical experiments 
with DNA keys to reveal a set of DNA sequences, as well as the use of the DNA 
sequences as digital keys to produce the Hash values (P-D-H protocol). The P-D-H 
protocol allows people to add new DECs, thus increasing security over time. The 
author can generate a set of DECs as a general signature for all of his works and 
documents, as well as a set of DECs for a particular item (figure 3a). Two different 
items from the same author will lead to two different block chains, even if the author 
had signed them with the same set of DECs. Two different items will pass through 
different collectors, who will add their DECs (from themselves and/or from third 
parties). Some information will be lost over time: ink will fade, DNA can degrade, and 
the DNA and digital keys could also be lost when passing through many generations, 
as well as after closing law firms (as third party). However, the item that can provide 
the most complete block chains, in full or the closest agreement with the published 
records, should be considered with the highest confidence as authentic. For 
example, the item A’ (figure 3B) is more likely to be authentic than A’’ (figure 3C) as 
the block chain is relatively more complete for A’. Moreover, the information of early 
digital and DNA keys (DEC1-9 ® I1-9) are associated with many works from the 
author, thus have the highest probability to be leaked, allowing forger to fake the 
signature materials.  
DNA sequencing is more error-prone than copying digitally. Nevertheless, very little 
computational effort would be required to correct a digital key, while the brutal force 
search for the entire digital key remains impossible. For example, to correct < 3 
mistakes in a 100 nt DNA sequence (corresponding to 2 or 4 bits in 200 bits of 
information) needs less than 300 + 9 x 100C2 = 44850 times of computation.  
The DECs have been designed to achieve high safety. For example, the combination 
of DEC1 to DEC5 generates a 355-bit DNA keys, while the third parties 1-4 produce a 
213-bit (Hash2) and a 71-bit (Hash3) DNA keys (figure 1). In the following scenario, 
their security can be partially compromised by: 
- Collectors. Collector #1 can fake the author's DEC, but not those from third parties, 
as well as those from future collectors. For example, collector #1 does not have the 
213-bit DNA key (Hash2) and 71-bit DNA key (Hash3).  
- de novo decryption. A person (X) who gets the signature materials can analyze it 
and try to guess the DNA keys. X will have the opportunity to test all possible primers 
and restriction enzymes (DNA keys) as a whole to find the digital keys. The security 
is compromised, for example, reducing the 355-bit DNA key associated with hash1 to 
5 independent 71-bit DNA keys, though it remains experimentally impossible to 
perform brutal force search. The randomness-incorporating DNA steganography 
method used in this paper possesses a QKD-like function and self-destruction 
feature, thus preventing the amplification of signature materials to perform high 
throughput testing (brutal force search). Moreover, because the P-D-H protocol 
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possesses a mechanism to increase security over time, newer and safer DNA 
steganography developed in the future can be incorporated into the blockchain.  
- Reverse decryption. A person (X) can try to obtain the digital keys through 
computational brutal force search. However, given that different inputs can lead to 
the same output with a hash function, the identified digital key Ix can be different from 
In. Even if Ix is by chance correct (Ix = In) and the person can fake some DNA keys, 
however, the DNA keys cannot produce the In when cross-referencing with other 
signature materials (figure 4A). For example, the DNA keys from X can reveal In only 
with counterfeit item-X, but not with authentic item-C (figure 4B). Similarly, the DNA 
keys from C can reveal In with item-C, but not with item-X. Therefore, the reverse 
decryption approach will have little impact on the safety of the DNA keys, as it cannot 
pass the cross-referencing test. 
 
 
Figure 4. Block cross-referencing. A) When different items are associated with the same 
DEC, of which the hash value and association (e.g. with the author, collector of third party) 
had been published, the DEC can be further verified through cross-referencing. For example, 
the author uses the same DEC for items 1-3, and a different DEC for item 4. The author’s 
DECs for items 1-3 can be cross-referenced with each other. B) The DNA keys from X can 
reveal In only with counterfeit item-X, but not with authentic item-C. Similarly, the DNA keys 
from C can reveal In only with item-C, but not with item-X. 
In summary, I propose the design of a signature material by combining cryptographic 
hash function with DNA steganography. Both methods can generate highly complex 
and safe keys. While the DNA-based molecular keys can be physically connected to 
the item to be certificated, the digital keys associated with published hash values can 
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make the recording system transparent and facilitate cross-referencing. Both digital 
key and DNA keys for a block is not limited to the SHA-2 functions (e.g. SHA-256 
and SHA-512) and the DNA steganography14 used in this paper as examples. Blocks 
could be cross-referenced, when author, collector, or third party uses the same DEC 
for different items. While the block chain will grow over time, new hash function and 
DNA steganography will be incorporated to improve the security over time. For 
example, in addition to primers and restriction enzymes as DNA keys, the 
CRISPR/Cas-based system could provide another attractive mechanism to enhance 
key complexity, by adding more layers of covering DNA, which can be removed 
specifically by CRISPR RNA sequence-dependent Cas trans-cleavage activity12. 
Most importantly, the efficacy of P-D-H protocol is based on the combination of a 
physical object, an experimental procedure, and a digital key as a signature. 
Although automation has become increasingly used in biotechnology, often known as 
high throughput methods, their speeds lag far behind the silicon-based computations. 
Therefore, if a DNA steganography possesses the same bits as a digital 
cryptography, the DNA keys are much less vulnerable than the digital keys against 
brutal force search. 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to thank Dr. Luca Mannocci for insightful discussions. This study is 
supported by BMBF (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research) grant 
metaZIK “OptiZeD” number 03Z22E511.  
 
References 
1. Silver, A., Five innovative ways to use 3D printing in the laboratory. Nature 
2019, 565 (7737), 123-124. 
2. Tumbleston, J. R.; Shirvanyants, D.; Ermoshkin, N.; Janusziewicz, R.; 
Johnson, A. R.; Kelly, D.; Chen, K.; Pinschmidt, R.; Rolland, J. P.; Ermoshkin, A.; 
Samulski, E. T.; DeSimone, J. M., Additive manufacturing. Continuous liquid interface 
production of 3D objects. Science 2015, 347 (6228), 1349-52. 
3. Konheim, A. G., Hashing in computer science : fifty years of slicing and dicing. 
John Wiley & Sons: Hoboken, N.J., 2010; p xvii, 386 p. 
4. Kosuri, S.; Church, G. M., Large-scale de novo DNA synthesis: technologies 
and applications. Nat Methods 2014, 11 (5), 499-507. 
5. Church, G. M.; Gao, Y.; Kosuri, S., Next-generation digital information storage 
in DNA. Science 2012, 337 (6102), 1628. 
6. Erlich, Y.; Zielinski, D., DNA Fountain enables a robust and efficient storage 
architecture. Science 2017, 355 (6328), 950-954. 
7. Hughes, R. A.; Ellington, A. D., Synthetic DNA Synthesis and Assembly: 
Putting the Synthetic in Synthetic Biology. Cold Spring Harb Perspect Biol 2017, 9 
(1). 
 11 
8. Mayer, C.; McInroy, G. R.; Murat, P.; Van Delft, P.; Balasubramanian, S., An 
Epigenetics-Inspired DNA-Based Data Storage System. Angew Chem Int Ed Engl 
2016, 55 (37), 11144-8. 
9. Organick, L.; Ang, S. D.; Chen, Y. J.; Lopez, R.; Yekhanin, S.; Makarychev, 
K.; Racz, M. Z.; Kamath, G.; Gopalan, P.; Nguyen, B.; Takahashi, C. N.; Newman, 
S.; Parker, H. Y.; Rashtchian, C.; Stewart, K.; Gupta, G.; Carlson, R.; Mulligan, J.; 
Carmean, D.; Seelig, G.; Ceze, L.; Strauss, K., Random access in large-scale DNA 
data storage. Nat Biotechnol 2018, 36 (3), 242-248. 
10. Goldman, N.; Bertone, P.; Chen, S.; Dessimoz, C.; LeProust, E. M.; Sipos, B.; 
Birney, E., Towards practical, high-capacity, low-maintenance information storage in 
synthesized DNA. Nature 2013, 494 (7435), 77-80. 
11. Zicheng, W.; Xiaohang, Z.; Hong, W.; Guangzhao, C. In Information hiding 
based on DNA steganography, 2013 IEEE 4th International Conference on Software 
Engineering and Service Science, 23-25 May 2013; 2013; pp 946-949. 
12. Li, S. Y.; Liu, J. K.; Zhao, G. P.; Wang, J., CADS: CRISPR/Cas12a-Assisted 
DNA Steganography for Securing the Storage and Transfer of DNA-Encoded 
Information. ACS Synth Biol 2018, 7 (4), 1174-1178. 
13. Clelland, C. T.; Risca, V.; Bancroft, C., Hiding messages in DNA microdots. 
Nature 1999, 399 (6736), 533-4. 
14. Cui, M.; Zhang, Y., Incorporating Randomness into DNA Steganography to 
Realize Secondary Secret key, Self-destruction, and Quantum Key Distribution-like 
Function. bioRxiv 2019, 725499. 
15. Cherry, K. M.; Qian, L., Scaling up molecular pattern recognition with DNA-
based winner-take-all neural networks. Nature 2018, 559 (7714), 370-376. 
16. Seelig, G.; Soloveichik, D.; Zhang, D. Y.; Winfree, E., Enzyme-free nucleic 
acid logic circuits. Science 2006, 314 (5805), 1585-8. 
17. Adleman, L. M., Molecular computation of solutions to combinatorial problems. 
Science 1994, 266 (5187), 1021-4. 
18. Qian, L.; Winfree, E.; Bruck, J., Neural network computation with DNA strand 
displacement cascades. Nature 2011, 475 (7356), 368-72. 
19. Bennett, C. H.; Brassard, G., Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution 
and coin tossing. Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers, 
Systems and Signal Processing 1984, 175, 8. 
20. Tomamichel, M.; Leverrier, A., A largely self-contained and complete security 
proof for quantum key distribution. arXiv:1506.08458 2017. 
21. Nakamoto, S., Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. 2008. 
 
  
 12 
Supporting information 
 
Examples of generating hash values 
 
 
